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Abstract
Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine becomes a dispute as a result from reckless application of States, started 
from the period towards 1914, to escape from burdensome treaties, and it continued to the period 
between the First and the Second World War. Rebus Sic Stantibus principle has been applied by many 
countries and it has been accepted by the majority of international law experts as part of international 
law. Even though there was a debate about the doctrine application. The first commentary said by 
applying negative form would make the fundamental change of circumstances principle. On the other 
hand, it is not the duty of legislation to define the scope of the fundamental change of circumstances 
principle, and this duty is granted to law. In the end it depends on the consideration of interested 
government body in terminating international treaties.
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Law Commission
I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, treaty will prevail if the circumstances around it are rela-
tively stable and do not go through significant change in accordance 
with what is promised. The parties of the treaty, in this condition, do 
not automatically have reasons to get away unilaterally from the agree-
ment . Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus provides opportunities for one of 
the treaty parties to step outside of the treaty unilaterally. The doctrine 
of Rebus Sic Stantibus teaches that if fundamental change of circum-
stances happens, this matter therefore can be a legal basis to terminate 
a treaty. If interested parties in a treaty have similar perception that an 
underlying change has occurred and made it impossible to embody the 
treaty, consequently both parties can dispose the issue in an amicable 
manner. If similar perception is not reached because in actuality one of 
the parties wants to escape from the treaty using Rebus Sic Stantibus 
doctrine, legal dispute will be inevitable.
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If a dispute happens in the milieu of national law, the settlement is 
enforceable in two ways. First, legislative body may enact legislation 
or in other form of regulation that formulate fundamental change of 
circumstances with distinct limitations. Disputing parties may refer to 
those regulations as a legal basis for dispute settlement. Second, if a 
dispute cannot be settled, the Judge of the Court will release a binding 
decision for both disputing parties as a dispute resolution.
In the milieu of international law, the circumstances are different. 
International community does not have a Central Government or a Leg-
islative Body who may enact regulation that is generally accepted or 
a Court that requires State as international law actor to abide by the 
Jurisdiction of the Court. Dispute settlement from a treaty is fully del-
egated to the State parties of the treaty. Nations dissatisfied with the 
status quo continue to regard it as a welcome device for escaping from 
burdensome treaties, while others fear it as a threat to stability and to 
their interests .1
The problem resulting from the right of State to cease or restrict 
its obligation in a treaty caused by a fundamental change of circum-
stances is an old and the most difficult issue to be solved by the law of 
international treaty .2 Before Vienna Convention on International Treaty 
1969 is in force, international law can merely provide a vague and un-
satisfactory answer in regards to the restriction of fundamental change 
of circumstances.3 International law authors have attempted to refer to 
national positive law to provide legal basis for the notion of fundamen-
tal change of circumstances, and it is said that as a general rule of posi-
tive law that all established international contracts also contain implicit 
requirements in addition to explicit requirements set out in a treaty, and 
both of those requirements are inseparable part of a treaty. According 
1 Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Change Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus) The 
American Journal of International Law AJIL, Vol. 61, 1967, p. 895.
2  Charles G. Fenwick, International Law, Third Edition, New York, 1948, p. 453-454: 
“The most difficult problem presented by international treaties, and the one in respect 
to which the fundamental principle of the faith of treaties has been put to its crucial 
test, as the question whether a state as release from its treaties obligation by reasons 
of an essential change of the circumstance under which is concluded on this point 
international law gives but a vague and unsatisfactory answer.
3  Ibid.
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to Roman law, each contract or treaty leads to the addition of Rebus Sic 
Stantibus provision.4
A firm scope will be harder to obtain, if the problem is ceded to the 
international law experts’ opinions that vary in defining the meaning of 
Rebus Sic Stantibus or ceded to the State parties to the treaty because 
the divergence of interest will put restriction to Rebus Sic Stantibus in 
correspondence with their own interest. This condition may only be 
amended through International Legislative body that stands on the in-
terest of States as members of international community. The efforts to 
unite all the perceptions on the definition of Rebus Sic Stantibus had 
been carried out by the International Law Commission in 1966, which 
had successfully formulated The Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties 
which contains several provisions relevant to the issue of Rebus Sic 
Stantibus, and article 59 explicitly seeks to delimit the scope of funda-
mental change of circumstances.5
The International Law Commission was established by the UN 
General Assembly in 1947 with a total of 15 members who are experts 
in international law, and appointed on the basis of expertise in interna-
tional law, and should not be the representative of their own country. 
Several times, the General Assembly has added the number of members 
in the International Law Commission. The duty of the Commission is 
to make codification or to foster the advancement of international law. 
Work of the International Law Commission, which is the prolongation 
body of the UN General Assembly, is expected to have a great bearing 
to either the doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus or the implementation of 
the doctrine .
II. DOCTRINE OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS
As discussed previously, a treaty that implicitly includes provision 
of Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine will imperil security or continuity of 
the treaty . This Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine becomes a dispute as a 
result from reckless application of States, started from the period to-
wards 1914, to escape from burdensome treaties, and it continued to the 
4  Ibid.
5  Oliver Y. Lissitzyn, Op. Cit., p. 895.
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period between the First and the Second World War. The examples on 
the application of Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine are:
”The decision of the China Government to terminate its so called” 
unequal “treaties with sovereign Powers – there are said to be some 
sixteen of them is defended, in the main, or a right, resulting from the 
rules of Rebus Sic Stantibus, what it’s often said is tacitly annexed to 
every covenant”.  Referring specifically, to the notification by the gov-
ernment of China to Belgium on October 27, 1926, of the intentions 
of the former government to terminate its treaty of November 2, 1865, 
with Belgium, a Chinese scholar says: “China abrogates the treaty on 
the recognized principle of Rebus Sic Stantibus, that is, the tacit condi-
tion recognized by International law as attending to all treaties that they 
shall cease to be obligation so far as the state of facts upon which they 
were founded has substantially changed”.6
Rebus Sic Stantibus principle has been applied by Austria – Hunga-
ry in 1908 as a justification for annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
based on the Treaty of Berlin 1878 and the Convention of Constanti-
nople which granted rights to Austria – Hungary to occupy or run the 
government. Also on the basis of this principle, Switzerland laid claim 
to plea for the 1909 treaty with Germany and Italy in regards to the rail 
road of Saint Gothard and in respect of this, Germany had granted its 
approval. The application of Rebus Sic Stantibus principle by States in 
the European region continued after the First World War ended.7
The application of the Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine came to an end 
in April 1924. Russian government, at that time, was at the opinion 
of that the treaty between Russia and other European powers, despite 
it needed to be ceased to be current, were not automatically expired 
although since the signing of the treaty there was a variance in interna-
tional situation and affected the continuity of the validity of the treaty. 
Before judgment was taken to terminate the treaty, the validity of those 
treaties had to be seen, in the first instance, from the Rebus Sic Stantibus 
point of view. The rapidly ongoing change of circumstances in interna-
tional community may induce the possibility of demand from interested 
6  J.W. Garner, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Termination of Treaties, 
The American Journal of International Law Vol 61 (1967), p. 509.
7  Ibid., p. 509-510.
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party to amend provision laid down in a treaty, even to terminate the 
validity of a treaty which is attributed to the conditions in the treaty that 
have prevailed for long are no longer suitable for the current condition, 
therefore such treaty is no longer operational.8
The drafters of the League of Nations Convention had anticipated 
the possibility of any fundamental change in the world that have bear-
ing to the condition in the treaty. Article 19 of the League of Nations 
Convention stipulated that the members of the League of Nations were 
given the authority to investigate and assessed international treaties that 
are still valid, with due observance of international situation that may 
imperil international peace. However, this General Assembly authority 
merely presented suggestion but did not have the authority to amend 
provision of the treaty unilaterally. During the life of the League of Na-
tions, there was no recommendation from the General Assembly that 
was accepted by interested States. For instance, in 1921, Bolivia laid 
claim to the League of Nations to amend the treaty provision with Chile 
that was concluded in 1904. According to Bolivia, 1904 treaty by Chile 
was forced unilaterally to be valid for Bolivia. Suggestion from the 
General Assembly to amend the provision in order that Bolivia could 
get access to traverse the Chilean region to the high seas was rejected 
by Chile.9
Regarding the status of Rebus Sic Stantibus in international law, 
there are no common grounds among the international law experts. 
Most of them consider that despite there is no concession, at least Re-
bus Sic Stantibus as a principle has been acknowledged as a general rule 
of international law and as a government policy of a State. All of them 
agree that the main principle of international treaty is Pacta Sunt Ser-
vanda, a treaty is binding for the parties of the treaty. On the other hand, 
the presence of a condition, where one of the parties may get away 
unilaterally from the treaty without being deemed as a violation of law, 
should be contemplated. The international law experts acknowledge 
that there has to be a special situation where parties, at least possess-
ing a moral right if it cannot be said as right according to law, may ask 
for an amendment for a treaty provision, or perhaps supersede a treaty 
8  Ibid .
9  Ibid., p. 513.
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with a completely new treaty, or termination of a treaty, on the ground 
of considerations that are in conformity with equity and justice. Herein-
after, it must be laid out what circumstances that gives the authority to 
unilaterally amend, supersede or terminate a treaty; in fact it is not easy 
to resolve firmly. To render the condition that pinpoint the occurrence 
of a change of circumstances, international law authors use a variety of 
terms that are not even.10
”Writers on International Law are accustomed to say that if there 
has been a ”total”, ”vital”, ”essential”, or ”substantial” change of cir-
cumstances since the treaty was entered into, the dissatisfied party may 
demand to be released from further  performance of its obligations”.11
There is an international law expert who interprets the Rebus Sic 
Stantibus principle as follows:
”All cases in which the reason for a treaty has failed, or there has 
been such a change of circumstances as to make its performance 
impracticable except at unreasonable sacrificed”.12
In reality, all the reasons or interpretations to the Rebus Sic Stanti-
bus principle are none other than providing a chance for the party who 
are dissatisfied with the validity of the treaty to be able to revise, super-
sede, or terminate the treaty.
To avoid any dispute, the party who intends to amend the condition 
laid down in the treaty, therefore, should approach and give explanation 
to the other party regarding the importance of amending or superseding 
the treaty, or terminating the treaty, and ask for consideration from the 
other party to get an approval. If it succeeds, the dispute in related to the 
treaty which may imperil the world peace can be avoided. If the posi-
tions of the parties in the treaty are more or less equal, perceived from 
the economic power, military or politics, thus the possibility to settle 
the dispute in a peaceful settlement is higher.
It will be a different case in a treaty between two unequal powers 
where the stronger party will compel its will in the treaty to the weaker 
party; therefore it will give rise to an unequal treaty. During the con-
10  J.W. Garner, Op.Cit., p. 511.
11  Ibid .
12  Ibid., p. 512.
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tinuance of the treaty, the weaker party will always feel inflicted on 
the obligation while the stronger party gains profit. In this case, the 
one who gives rise to the loss of the weaker party is an incriminating 
condition from the treaty itself. If there is a fundamental change of cir-
cumstances, perhaps the burden of obligation that has to be borne by the 
weaker party will be far greater. Therefore, the weaker party may ask 
to terminate the treaty on the ground of this additional burden which is 
impossible to be fulfilled. Resistance by the stronger party for this re-
quest means a violation to the equal position and sovereignty principle 
between States.
The development of interstates relation in the 20th century has made 
a good progress, because there has been a condition where States’ pow-
er is restricted to compel its will with force as an implementation of its 
foreign politics. Before 1914, States’ freedom to act unilaterally was 
yet restricted. Each State must be aware that other State perhaps finds 
a reason to settle the dispute with force as in military confrontation, 
therefore weaker party would be more inflicted on fulfilling all the pro-
visions in the treaty according to the stronger party’s demand. Stronger 
party could also demand amendment of the treaty provision with force. 
Using those two means, which may lead to war, amendment of treaty 
can be realized for the benefit of the stronger party.
To impair the tendency of the stronger party to compel its will, Re-
bus Sic Stantibus principle must be related to the claim to obtain jus-
tice and legal certainty. Legal certainty is the main value in every legal 
system, and it is able to deter any violation of law. The relation among 
legal actors needs a behavior that can be trusted in the scope of the 
validity of law. The stability of a treaty has to be established by the 
treaty actors. On the other hand, sometimes in special circumstances, an 
amendment needs to be conducted. In this case, prior approval from the 
parties is needed in order to uphold the value of fairness.
In the constraint of treaty, provision of Pacta Sunt Servanda is a 
manifestation of the idea that the tie resulting from a treaty cannot be 
terminated, while the idea of Rebus Sic Stantibus is a violation of the tie 
resulting from a treaty and it provides opportunity for change towards 
the obligation required in the treaty. International law as a simple law 
order highly relies on the treaty as a tie of association from international 
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community that has no central government. Therefore it can be under-
stand that simple law order tends to consider binding power of a treaty 
as an absolute matter.13
The basic idea of Rebus Sic Stantibus is that treaty is a free will of 
the treaty parties, and not related to legal system where there are higher 
legal norms that prevail for the treaty, although it is not explicitly men-
tioned as a provision in a treaty. In the national positive legal system, 
the effectiveness of the wills of the parties is restricted with a subjective 
element such as a treaty has to be conducted in good faith, no infringe-
ment of public orders. Element of justice and feasibility must be noticed 
in the implementation of a treaty. Generally accepted legal norms in a 
higher position which also prevail for the implementation of each treaty 
only occurs in advance legal systems.
In the simple law order, other than relying on the binding power 
of treaty, a value out of the wills of the parties in order that the treaty 
will remain effective, as in considering that treaty has a “sacred value”. 
Therefore all the difference of opinion in regards to the treaty is settled 
through argumentation, not compelled with force anymore. In the pre-
amble of the League of Nations Convention, it is mentioned about “a 
scrupulous respect for all treaty objections” as a means “to promote 
international cooperation and to achieve international peace and se-
curity”. As a comparison between the UN Charter and the League of 
Nations Convention, United Nations has a different opinion. The UN 
Charter does not deem a treaty as a sacred matter, in the preamble of 
the charter it is stated that the members of the United Nations are deter-
mined “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligation arising from treaties and other sources of international law 
can be maintained”.
Society is aware that the feeling of respect for a treaty can only be 
achieved with several requirements. One of them is that a treaty can-
not fulfill its obligation if the burden of obligation is too burdensome; 
normally, that obligation is impossible to be fulfilled. Treaty will lose 
respect if demand from the stronger party exceeds the reasonable basis, 
retaining the validity of the treaty is not in conformity with justice. If in 
13  Prof. Mr. B.V.A. Rőling, De Clausula “Rebus Sic Stantibus” in het Volkenrecht, 
Rechtsgeleerde Magazijn, Themis, Tjeenk Willink Zwolle 1973-5/2, p. 580-581.
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the reality the reasonable basis is retained, therefore in actuality there is 
no need to polarize between Pacta Sunt Servanda and Rebus Sic Stan-
tibus because they both complete each other.
Treaty is binding as long as the circumstances do not change. If 
there is a change of circumstances, there should be a possibility to ter-
minate the treaty. Article 19 of the League of Nations Convention is not 
explicitly reiterated in the UN Charter. However, it does not mean that 
the United Nations cannot intervene. The General Assembly or Security 
Council is given its own role to participate in the settlement of dispute 
about treaty, including dispute about change of circumstances.
Not all international law experts doubt the position of the Rebus Sic 
Stantibus doctrine in international law. H. Lauterpacht said that Rebus 
Sic Stantibus is a legal principle and not merely a positive moral rule. 
He argued that:
”The application of the Doctrin Rebus Sic Stantibus in its jurisdic-
tion aspect is essentially is a legal matters. The circumstances that 
it involves, the consideration of facts does not of course, deprive of 
its characters.”14
Article 36 of the Charter of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice stated that the Court has the power to investigate and decide, 
“any question of International Law,” and it does not mean that the Court 
is not authorized to investigate every time a fact that may trigger an 
international dispute occurs. The problem for the Court is that whether 
the Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus can be applied in that fact. For the 
Court, there is no proper reason to interpret “any question of interna-
tional law” theoretically, for instance, whether the Doctrine of Rebus 
Sic Stantibus is part of International Law.15
The next chapter will discuss the territorial dispute in the Upper 
Savoy and the District of GEX between France and Switzerland where 
the legal consideration implicates the possibility to apply the Doctrine 
of Rebus Sic Stantibus.16
14  H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, Oxford at 
the Clarendon Press, p. 280.
15  Ibid, p. 280-281.
16  L.C. Green, International Law through the Cases, Frederich A. Prager, New York, 
1959, p. 764-777.
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III. THE CASE OF “THE FREE ZONES OF UPPER SAVOY AND 
THE DISTRICT OF GEX”
France and Switzerland agreed to file territorial dispute in the Free 
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of GEX between both countries 
to the Permanent Court of International Justice which is accommodated 
in “The France-Swiss Special Agreement of 30 October 1924” which 
was ratified by the French Parliament in 1928. This case was later pre-
sented to the Permanent Court on 19 August 1926 and the final judg-
ment from the Court was given on 6 December 1930.
This dispute occurred after the Second World War ended which was 
marked by the signing of the Treaty of Versailles between the Allies and 
Germany on 28 June 1919, imposed unilaterally to the Government of 
Germany .
Towards the effectuation of the Special Agreement, on 5 to 18 May 
1919, there was an exchange of diplomatic notes between Switzerland 
and France which enclosed article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles. In 
its diplomatic note, French unilaterally stated that because there was 
a change of circumstances, marked by the end of the First World War, 
therefore the treaty which was concluded in 1815 which established 
the Neutral Zone of Upper Savoy and the Duty-Free Zone in the Dis-
trict of GEX were no longer consistent to the current condition, and the 
impact has wiped the status of Neutral Zone while the Duty-Free Zone 
to be settled through negotiation. On the other hand, the role of the 
Permanent Court, in addition to assess the validity of unilateral act of 
France according to international law, was also loaded with the issue of 
ratification of Special Agreement according to the Swiss Constitution, 
referendum is needed following the ratification by the Swiss Parlia-
ment. The outcome of the referendum from the Swiss people rejected 
the possibility of the change of juridical position of Free Zones, and did 
not accept the unilateral act by France.17
The initial juridical issue that had to be answered by the Court was 
whether article 435 paragraph 2 had revoked or included provision to 
may revoke the regime of Free Zone that had been long established, 
17  DR. J.H.W. Verzyl, The Jurisprudence of the World Court, A case by case com-
mentary Volume I, The Permanent Court of International Justice (1922-1940) A.W. 
Sijthoff-Leyden, 1965, p. 228-229.
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and determined a proper timeline for both parties to settle the issue in 
a peaceful manner. The Court judgment regarding this issue was later 
communicated to the interested parties. Apparently, outside the Court, 
the disputing parties also conducted a series of negotiations to settle the 
difference of opinion in the Free Zone. The outcome of the negotiation 
as a consideration was presented to the Court. In this instance, the Court 
explicitly overruled the outcome of the negotiation and did not give ap-
proval of discreet negotiations, with the consideration pursuant to the 
spirit or provision of the Charter of the Permanent Court, referring to 
article 54 paragraph 3 (The deliberations of the court shall take place 
in private and remain secret) and article 58 (The Judgment ….. shall 
be read in open court, due notice having been given to the agents), in 
conclusion, the Court could not disregard the provision of the Charter 
despite there was a joint proposal from the disputing parties. The firm 
gesture of the Court is no doubt that in days to come States would not be 
courageous to ask for confirmation from the Court in regards to a judg-
ment resulting from a private negotiation outside the Court.18
On the other hand, the Court was under an obligation to set a time-
line for both States to settle their dispute. However, the determination of 
the timeline had no use if in the same time it did not provide legal opin-
ion with respect to the issue filed by the disputing parties. Eight out of 
twelve Judges of the Permanent Court who sit on the Council of Judges 
when the judgment was issued on 19 August 1929 (Anzilloti, Loder, De 
Bustamente, Altamira, Oda, Huber, Hughes and Wang) agreed on the 
definition of article 435 paragraph 2: based on their opinion, this article 
did not terminate the legal relation between France and Switzerland and 
did not exempt any obligation to Switzerland to receive nullification of 
the Free Zone as a basis to establish a new treaty with France. The legal 
opinion of the Judges concluded that unilateral act by France in 1923 
was in conflict with law.19
In taking a decision, the Court avoided to examine the doctrine of 
Rebus Sic Stantibus, a controversial issue, as a theoretical foundation 
of the judgment. In regards to the issue of whether article 435 had ter-
minated the existence of Neutral Zone and Free Zone was settled by 
18  Ibid, p. 230.
19  Ibid .
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interpreting the treaty and the commentary of the juridical impact for 
both parties.
The Court considerations were as follows: both paragraph 1 and 
paragraph 2 of article 435 stated that old agreement which was accom-
modated in the 1815 treaty is “no longer consistent with the current 
condition”. Article 435 paragraph 1 stipulates about termination of 
Neutral Zone, and this termination had been settled through an agree-
ment between France and Switzerland. On the other hand, article 435 
paragraph 2 which regulates about Free Zone still needs to be discussed 
through negotiations between both States. Both States agreed that either 
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 do not automatically terminate the treaty, 
except if the treaty provision implicitly contains Rebus Sic Stantibus 
principle. The Court considered that article 435 could not be enforced 
for Switzerland, except if Switzerland had agreed of this article. Note 
of the Federal Council of Switzerland dated on 5 May 1919 explicitly 
stated that they did not agree with the termination of Free Zone system 
as desired by France.20
Four of the Court Judges presented dissenting opinions with regards 
to the application of the Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine. The gist of the 
dissenting opinions from for minority Judges (Nyholm, Negulesco, 
Dreyfus, and Pessộa) is as follows:
”The gist of their they statement is the reference to the doctrine 
rebus sic stantibus, with which indeed deploy against the majority 
the strongest argument available to them under the circumstances. 
According to them, Article 435 evidently implies an application of 
the notorious principle that an international treaty remains in force 
no longer than the conditions in which, and with a view to which, 
it was originally concluded, continue to exist. The legal operation 
of that principle, however, is different for the zone of Gex and the 
Sardinian zone. Proceeding on their thesis that Switzerland has no 
indipendent rights with regard to the former zone, they state that 
the Powers of 1815 were fully entitled to put an end to the exis-
tence of that zone without the consent of Switzerland, because of the 
changed conditions.”21
20  Ibid., p. 235.
21  Ibid., p. 238.
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On the other hand, it is regretted that the doctrine of Rebus Sic Stan-
tibus by the four Judges with dissenting opinion was not discussed and 
the limits of the validity of a fundamental change of circumstances 
were not formulated.
To sum up, it can be said that there is no uniformity in the definition 
of the Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine during the period before the First 
World War until the issuance of Permanent Court judgment in 1930 
concerning the case of “the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District 
of GEX”. In States practice towards the occurrence of the First World 
War in 1914, States unilaterally terminated a treaty using Rebus Sic 
Stantibus doctrine in order for escaping from burdensome treaties. Dur-
ing that time, Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine was an implicit provision 
contained in the treaty. Practice of unilateral termination of a treaty was 
clearly ruining international law order. On the other hand, control for 
termination of treaty must be arranged and let the third party in, such 
as International Court, to provide legal certainty. However, Permanent 
Court in the previously discussed case precisely avoided the application 
of Rebus Sic Stantibus and settled the dispute through treaty interpreta-
tion as a basis for the Court judgment, without presenting any commen-
tary on the validity of Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine in international law .
Prof. J.L. Brierly referred to the Permanent Court judgment regard-
ing the Free Zones and stated that:
In short, the clausula is a rule of construction which secures that a 
reasonable effect shall be given to the treaty rather than the unrea-
sonable one which would result from a literal adherence to its ex-
pressed terms only. On this view the similarity between the doctrine 
of rebus sic stantibus and that of the ’implied term’ in the English 
law of the frustation of contract is very close. Neither a treaty in 
international nor a contract in English law is dissolved merely by a 
change of circumstances; they are only dissolved if a term can fairly 
be read into them providing that in the event which has happened 
they are to be dissolved. Both doctrines attempt not to defeat but 
to fulfil the intention, or as the English cases call it the ’presumed 
intention’, of the parties.22
22  J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nation, Sixth Edition, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 
1963, p. 336 – 337.
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Prof. Brierly also stated that:
”As defined by the Permanent Court the doctrine of RebusSsic Stan-
tibus is clearly a reasonable doctrine which it is right that inter-
national law should recognize. But as so defined it is a doctrine of 
limited scope which has little to do with the problem of obsolete 
or oppressive treaties, for which it is too often supposed to be the 
solution.”23
The issue of “oppressive” or “obsolete treaties obligation”, both of 
them are important in international relation, however the more harming 
issue for the international relation order is oppressive treaties, particu-
larly in regards to the boundary issue between states. Dispute settle-
ment regarding States boundary is more to international relation than 
international law. Boundary treaties in international law are categorized 
as political treaties, and the dispute settlement is settled in a political 
manner, not by law.24
Prof. Philip C. Jessup also stated that the application of Rebus Sic 
Stantibus doctrine in political treaties will harm the harmony of power 
between States.
”For political treaties and for the invocation of political changes in 
the balance of power, the doctrine is pernicious. In such situations 
it would amount to the preposition that no peace treaty accepted by 
a defeated state remains valid after that state recovers sufficiently 
or the victors weaken sufficiently to make it politically possible for 
the defeated state to throw off the burden without danger of another 
defeat. No more unsettling legal principle could be imagined; but 
it would in fact, if accepted, reflect what has frequently occurred. 
For this very reason the doctrine Rebus Sic Stantibus has been 
discredited.”25
General opinions that are quite many from international law experts, 
all of them accept unilaterally termination of a treaty, the issue of fun-
damental change of circumstances must be approved by the interested 
23  Ibid., p. 338
24  Ibid., p. 339
25  Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, An Introduction, The Matmullar Com-
pany New York 1958, p. 150 – 151.
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parties to the treaty. If one party does not agree that there has been a 
fundamental change, the treaty therefore will remain in force through-
out the period set out in the treaty.26
IV.  INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
International Law Commission (Commission) in carrying out its 
duties to make a codification of the law of international treaty realizes 
that Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine, after the Second World War ended, 
has been accepted by the majority of international law experts as part 
of international law. However, international law experts also suggest 
that the application of Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine is carried out with a 
strong caveat and the scope of its validity to be restricted, considering 
that international law does not have a compelling jurisdiction.
In the continuity of the validity of international law, change of cir-
cumstances often occurs and is easily stated that there has been a fun-
damental change of circumstances. In reality it does not cause the treaty 
to cease to be current. This change of circumstances is often used as a 
reason for escaping from burdensome treaties.
Several theories were presented to meet the juridical basis of Rebus 
Sic Stantibus doctrine, and three theories were chosen to be considered 
by the Commission, namely:
1.  Under the theory the parties are presumed to have had in mind 
the continuance of certain circumstances of as the basis of their 
agreement and to have intended the treaty to be subject to an implied 
condition by which it is an essential change in those circumstances
2. Under the second theory, international law is considered to impose 
upon the parties to a treaty an objective rule of law prescribing that 
an essential change of circumstances entitles any of the parties to 
require the termination of the treaty.
3. Under the third theory, which is a mixture of the first two, the 
doctrine is considered to be an objective rule of law the operation of 
which is to import into the treaty, regardless of the intention of the 
26  Mr. J.P.A. Francois, Grondlijnen van Het Volkenrecht, Derde Druk, Zwolle 1967, 
p. 329.
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parties, an implied condition that it will come to an end if there is an 
essential change  of circumstances.27
The distinction that determines between the second and third theory 
is that legal provision will prevail by inserting implicit requirements to 
the treaty, therefore if there is a fundamental change, treaty will termi-
nate automatically. Whereas according to the second theory, it merely 
grants rights to the parties to the treaty to terminate the treaty. However, 
if the termination of the treaty is not allowed to be carried out unilater-
ally if there is a fundamental change of circumstances, thus the distinc-
tion between both theories is not that different. The conclusion is that 
the third theory is not a supplementing of the second theory.
The Commission, therefore, rejected the third theory and took the 
second theory as a legal basis of Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine, is ob-
jective law provision than an assumption of the augment of implicit 
requirement in the treaty. If fundamental change occurs and radically 
influences the treaty, the parties therefore may terminate the treaty ac-
cording to the doctrine as an objective law provision based on equity 
and justice.
The Commission filed a proposal regarding the draft article for the 
amendment of fundamental change of circumstances to the General As-
sembly of the United Nations which is contained in the draft article 44 
of 1963 and article 59 of 1966. The Commission was no longer using 
the term “Rebus Sic Stantibus” as the title of the draft article, because it 
is closely related to implicit provision of a treaty, and was superseded 
with the term “Fundamental Change of Circumstances” as the title of 
the draft article .
Article 59 Fundamental Change of Circumstances
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occured with 
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of treaty, and 
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a 
ground for terminating or with drawing from the treaty unless;
a.  The existence of the circumstances constituted an essential basis 
27  Yearbook of the International Commissions 1963 Volume II, p. 82-88.
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of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
b. the effect of the change in radically to transform the scope of 
obligation still to be performed under the treaty;
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked:
a.   as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty estab-
lishing a boundary;
b. if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party 
invoking it either of the treaty or of a different international ob-
ligation owed to the other parties to the treaty 
The Commission gave commentary to the above draft article that 
the Rebus Sic Stantibus principle in States practice is rarely used, either 
directly by applying the Rebus Sic Stantibus principle (eo nomine) or 
by referring to the general law principle as a legal basis to terminate the 
treaty or to amend requirements or obligations cause by a fundamental 
change. Thorough examination on States practice at the time being is 
not able to be included in the Commission report. However there is 
a vast acceptance that fundamental change principle can be used as a 
justification to terminate or amend the substance of the treaty. On the 
other hand, there is a strong opinion that unilateral termination cannot 
be justified by alibi fundamental change of circumstances.28
The Commission does not recognize the view that Rebus Sic Stan-
tibus doctrine can only be applied in perpetual treaties, and there are 
implicit requirements in perpetual treaties that if there is a fundamen-
tal change of circumstances, treaty will automatically come to an end. 
Long term treaties such as for ten, twenty one, or ninety years, includ-
ing that change of circumstances will occur in this kind of treaty that 
radically influences the substance of the treaty. The great change of 
circumstances in this century may occur in ten or twenty years. Accord-
ing to the opinion by the Commission, if equity and justice principle 
are applied, essentially, there is no distinction between perpetual trea-
ties and long term treaties. Moreover many modern international law 
authors consider that it is incorrect that Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrine 
can only be applied strictly to perpetual treaties, Rebus Sic Stantibus 
28  Yearbook of the International Commissions 1966 Vol II (Yearbook ILC 1966 II), 
p. 257.
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doctrine is regarded as an objective rule of law, and therefore there is 
no more distinction between perpetual and limited treaties. For a brief 
term treaty, the application of the doctrine is clearly without any utility 
because termination of a treaty may be regulated upon notice by the 
interested parties.29 However there is a comment from the international 
law perspective,
”Strictly speaking, there is no requirement in all cases that non per-
formance be preceeded or accompanied by a formal notice to the 
other parties, although concern for order lines, prudence and cour-
tesy made the giving of such notice generally desirable.”30
Between the draft article 59 and article 62 of Vienna Convention 
1969 as the official article, there are only a few differences. The word 
“scope” in the article 59 paragraph (b) becomes “extent” in the article 
62 paragraph (b). Objection towards the word “scope” in article 59 
paragraph 1(b) is stated by an international law expert as follows:
”Particularly puzzling in the term ’scope’. The limitation would ex-
clude most of the change invoke in the past or likely to be invoked in 
the future, unless the world scope is given the unatural meaning of 
’burden’. This limitation is clearly not supported by logic of giving 
effect to the intention and expectation of the parties and has little 
support in practice”.31
The sentence in article 59 paragraph 2(a) is amended by article 62 
paragraph 2(a), becomes: if the treaty establishes a boundary; or ac-
cording to Commission,
”The expression ’treaty establishing a boundary’ was a substituted 
for a ’treaty fixing a boundary’ by the Commission in response to com-
ments of Government, as being a broaden expression which would 
embrace treaties of cession as well as delimitation of treaties”.32
Article 62 of Vienna Convention adds one more paragraph which is 
paragraph 3:
29  Yearbook I.L.C. 1963 (II), p. 83-84.
30  Oliver J.Lissitzyn, Op. Cit., p. 911.
31  Oliver J.Lissitzyn, Op. Cit., p. 917.
32  Yearbook I.L.C. 1966 (II), p. 259.
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”If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a funda-
mental change of circumstance as a ground for terminating it may 
also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operations 
of a treaty”33
The augment of paragraph 3 came from a proposal by the delegation 
of Canada and Finland during the Vienna Conference which stated that 
if one of the party may terminate the treaty with regards to a funda-
mental change of circumstances, therefore party to the treaty may also 
propose based on that change to defer the effectuation of a treaty.34
In order that the principle contained in the article 62 paragraph 1 of 
the Vienna Convention 1969 can be applied in practice, it needs several 
requirements as follows:
1.  The change must be of circumstances which existed at the time the 
treaty was concluded;
2.  The change must be a fundamental one;
3.  The change must be also be one not foreseen by the parties by the 
time of the conclusion of the treaty;
4.  The existence of those circumstances must have constitution an 
essential based of the consent of the parties to be bound by the 
treaty; and
5.  The effect of the change must be radically transform the scope of 
obligations still to be performed under the treaty.35
It should be emphasized that a claim to terminate a treaty based on 
fundamental change of circumstances should meet those five require-
ments invariably. Regulation in negative form will reject a claim that 
only meets half of those requirements. The Commission presented a 
final comment after completing its role regarding the formulation of 
article 59 of the Draft Article (which later became Article 62 of the Vi-
enna Convention 1969) as follows:
33  T.O. Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties, A.W. Sijthoff – Leiden 1994, p. 127.
34  Ibid .
35  T.O. Elias, Op. Cit., p. 125, Yearbook ILC 1966 (II), p. 259.
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”It did not think that a principle valid in itself could or should be re-
jected because of a risk that a state acting in bad faith might seek to 
abuse the principle. The proper function of codification, it believed, 
was to minimize those risks by strictly defined and circumscribing 
the conditions under which recourse may be had to the principle; 
and has sought to do in the present article.”36
V. CONCLUSION 
Hitherto there is yet a conclusion that the fundamental change of 
circumstances principle as set out in the article 62 paragraph 1 of Vi-
enna Convention can impair an abuse by applying negative form, be-
cause there is yet a dispute concerning the issue of fundamental change 
of circumstances in international forum. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the fundamental change of circumstances principle is yet discussed in 
a case and International Court has yet taken a stand, it needs to be cog-
nized by the interested parties and to be taught in university. Not all 
States ratify Vienna Convention 1969, including Indonesia. However in 
the Indonesian Law No. 24 of 2000 (Undang-undang Republik Indone-
sia Nomor 24 Tahun 2000), dated on 23 October 2000, on International 
Treaties, in Chapter VI, about Termination of International Treaties in 
article 18 paragraph c, it is stated that termination of a treaty may occur 
when there is a fundamental change that influences the treaty execution. 
In the commentary of article 18, it is mentioned that an international 
treaty may cease when one of the points in this article has occurred. It is 
not the duty of legislation to define the scope of the fundamental change 
of circumstances principle, and this duty is granted to law. This writing 
is expected to be useful for the consideration of interested government 
body in terminating international treaties.
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